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 The Dawn of the Dead: (Improbable) Art After 
AI-Zombie Apocalypsei 
In recent years there has been growing interest in artificial neural networks (ANNs) which are quickly 
becoming the primary device for machine learning. Used for finding patterns in large data sets, ANNs 
were also recently employed in many artistic contexts: as tools for artists, semi-independent 
creators of content, and even as invisible “critics” which / who predict our aesthetic preferences. 
The aim of this paper is to speculate about the disruptive effect of these ‘alien agencies’ on the 
(modernist) aesthetic regime of art centred around the notion of autonomy. The author examines 
how neural networks and connectionist epistemologies may potentially affect the most common 
ways of producing, circulating, and valorising art. He claims that the possibility of automatizing 
creativity and art criticism may lead to the emergence of a new aesthetic regime based on forms of 
dynamic, distributed and probabilistic governance.  
Artificial neural networks. Aesthetics. Regimes of art. Posthuman aesthetics. Digital aesthetics. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The rumour goes that Rembrandt’s ‘A Cat Sitting on 
MacBook Air’ and Van Gogh’s ‘Petunias (by Kac)’ 
were recently discovered and soon will be on display 
in Louvre in Paris (in collaboration with Google and 
MIT). This event is planned as a follow-up to the 
recent presentation of ‘The Next Rembrandt’ 
(alternative title ‘A Dude Who Never Existed’) which 
was unveiled in Amsterdam at Rembrandt House in 
2016 (in collaboration with ING and Microsoft). The 
3D-printed painting was co-created by a team of 
programmers, art historians and a deep learning 
algorithm which analysed all existing 346 works of 
the Dutch Master to learn his ‘signature style’ 
(Blakemore 2016). Understandably, the project 
attracted a lot of interest and – naturally – incited 
controversies concerning its rightful allocation 
(uglow 2017): does it belong to the museum or 
gallery? And if so, then to what kind of museum? Of 
contemporary or classical art? Or maybe it 
‘deserves’ a new kind of institution altogether which 
could serve as a ghetto for masterpieces made by 
non-human agents? But would it not be Entartete 
Kunst all over again? District 9 for inhuman art? 
 
Such considerations may sound as untimely and 
ridiculous science fiction, but art made by artificial 
neural networks (ANNs) and deep learning 
algorithms has already been shown in galleries and 
sold on auctions (for example, by Gray Area 
Foundation for the Arts). And – to make things even 
more complex and confusing for art critics – different 
neural networks are being used not as mere tools 
(or companions) by artists, but also as intelligent 
agents ‘who’ predict our aesthetic choices (‘if you 
liked this movie, then there is 67 per cent chance 
that you will also like that one’), or even as virtual 
museum-goers ‘who’ study art by analysing 
databases in museum collections. It is thus 
reasonable to speculate that deep learning software 
based on neural networks, which spread so rapidly 
in recent years across social networks and major 
entertainment websites, may potentially create a 
completely new aesthetic environment, in part 
visible (in the form of images), and in part invisible 
(in the form of ‘suggestions’). So even though 
artists/engineers who ‘use’ deep learning 
technology for creative purpose claim that they 
simply use the tools offered to them by engineers 
(Tyka 2015), just like artists in the past were handed 
cameras and graphic programs, I would argue that 
the issue we are facing is, in fact, far more 
complicated. 
 
First of all, photography, often regarded as the first 
‘mechanical art’, had to wait for over a century to be 
finally recognised by art institutions (Cotton 2004), 
whereas the recognition of deep learning software 
as art medium came almost instantaneously. 
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Secondly, although I would hesitate to make strong 
essentialist distinctions, there is one crucial 
difference between mechanical cameras and neural 
networks: when the former do not change 
(significantly) in the process of making pictures, the 
latter evolve in time. As a result, nets which share 
the same initial architecture must vary significantly 
depending on their ‘experience’: it is possible to 
imagine fully functional software capable of 
mimicking Rembrandt, Picasso, or even of creating 
an uncanny hybrid of the two. 
 
The second – and even more important – difference 
explaining why neural networks were immediately 
embraced by the art world and its institutions is 
cultural. In many ways contemporary art market and 
critical discourse has been long ready to welcome 
Rembrasso and his undead friends. It suffices to 
mention in this context that once popular prefixes 
like ‘neo-‘ or ‘post-‘ were recently supplemented by 
a new term eagerly added by critics to the old labels 
of art movements: the ‘zombie’. Hence, if ‘zombie 
formalism’ could have been ‘the new thing’ on the 
market a few years ago (Robinson 2014), opening 
new exhibitions in the future may as well be 
advertised as opening old graves. Are we thus 
doomed to a zombie apocalypse and the eternal 
return of old classics mating and merging in the 
deepest layers of neural networks? I want to argue 
and speculate that the introduction of Artificial 
Neural Networks (ANNs) technologies into the art 
field can, in fact, disrupt the axiological and 
institutional foundations of modern Western 
aesthetics and of our ‘regime of art’. To reflect on 
such possibility I will try to examine the technological 
specificity of neural networks in the context of 
Jacques Rancière’s philosophy. I find his arguments 
and categories particularly appropriate for such 
speculation, because they allow me to include wider 
political and communicational ramifications and at 
the same time avoid techno-determinist 
simplification. Moreover, Rancière’s approach to 
aesthetics emphasises the intersubjective 
dimension of art and the distributed character of 
aesthetic values. Regimes of art, as he defines 
them, are ‘specific types of connection between 
ways of producing works of art or developing 
practices, forms of visibility that disclose them, and 
ways of conceptualizing the former and the latter’ 
(Rancière 2006: 20). Each regime can be thus 
understood – in slightly cybernetic terms – as a 
distinctive autopoietic system that emerges 
spontaneously and governs how artworks are 
produced, distributed, valued and used. In my 
opinion, the sheer possibility of employing neural 
networks to automatise ‘production of works of art’ 
and to administer ‘forms of their visibility’ must – as 
a result – somehow affect the way of 
‘conceptualizing the former and the latter’. It is highly 
problematic to consider deep learning software – 
used, for example, for making applications for artists 
– in terms of simple tools or ‘a new medium’.  
 
What characterises and distinguishes neural 
networks from other types of algorithms (and 
programs) is the degree of autonomy in data 
processing. In Radical Technologies Adam 
Greenfield writes that neural networks possess ‘the 
ability to perform complicated tasks without being 
explicitly instructed in how to do so, and it is how 
they now stand to acquire the capabilities we have 
previously thought of as the exclusive province of 
the human’ (2017). Thus, reducing virtual 
Rembrandts and other ‘deep dreamers’ to objects 
only manipulated by humans would be a mistake. 
Hence my question: can our aesthetic categories still 
hold in the age of artificial artists, zombie returns, 
statistical criticism, and augmentation of taste? Art 
is no longer only a human endeavour, so the long-
lasting trichotomy of artist, medium and material 
becomes dubious. 
 
However, I do not want to suggest that the 
introduction of a new technology into the field of 
artistic practice must simply cause a dramatic 
cultural change. It would be ridiculous to argue for 
direct causation in the complex and heterogeneous 
reality of contemporary art practice. On the contrary, 
an epistemological revolution which in the first place 
allowed critics, museum directors, curators and art 
dealers to conceive of images produced by Artificial 
Intelligence as art has already been creeping in for 
a long time. The possibility of speculating about ‘the 
new’ is always founded on the observation of the 
epistemological peripheries. A theoretical 
investigation of ANNs in the context of art can shed 
some light both on the present state of our aesthetic 
regime and on their possible futures. 
2. CONNECTIONIST EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE 
AUTONOMOUS SUBJECT 
I will begin my considerations by raising an objection 
to the theoretical framework I will be using, that is 
Rancière’s theory of “regimes of art”. What strikes 
me the most about his categorization is its deeply 
conservative anthropocentrism hidden underneath 
the layers of conceptual inventiveness, progressive 
political agenda and critical insight. In actuality his 
argument is directed against the wide-spread 
assumption that the avant-garde was responsible for 
revolutionizing art and its relation to politics and 
social life. Rancière claims that avant-garde artists 
were, as a matter of fact, not rebels, but successors 
of the 19th-century modernists who laid foundations 
for the idea of art autonomy (2006: 30). What linked 
romantic poets and avant-garde experimenters – 
who seem to belong to completely different 
epistemological and aesthetic paradigms – was the 
absolute autonomy of the artistic object (or of art as 
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such). This theory elegantly explains, for example, 
why it turned out to be so easy to hijack and reroute 
the anti-bourgeois art of the early avant-garde by the 
bourgeois institutions. Rancière’s subversive 
conservatism makes him also sceptical towards the 
popular assumption that mechanical reproduction 
played a crucial role in the process of giving voice to 
the masses (Benjamin 1969 [1936]). He writes: ‘In 
order for the mechanical arts to be able to confer 
visibility on the masses, or rather on anonymous 
individuals, they first need to be recognized as arts. 
That is to say that they first need to be put into 
practice and recognized as something other than 
techniques of reproduction or transmission’ (2006: 
32). To support this view he reminds us that the 
appreciation of the mundane and everyday life can 
be traced to the times before the invention of 
daguerreotype, whereas the success of realism and 
naturalism (also as literature for the bourgeois) 
definitely predates mass cinematography.  
 
On the one hand, this understanding of the relation 
between technology and culture – the primacy of the 
latter over the former – holds true for my 
considerations too. If we look at the new emerging 
practices on the Internet and its semi-formal, 
distributed institutions which display art on social 
media, we can already see some crucial differences 
between the ‘old order’ and the ‘new chaos’ 
dissolving categories like authorship and artwork. 
On the other, it would be a mistake to overlook how 
certain technologies influence, affect and alter 
already existing processes. And just like the 
availability of cheap reproductions transmitted 
through unidirectional media (books, TV), 
accelerated and reinforced the tendency to 
celebrate star artists, one can imagine that neural 
network software which is capable of producing ‘The 
Next Rembrandts’ et cetera will allow various actors 
to find new methods of profiting from Old Masters’ 
art. However, the possibility of endless creation of 
new Breughels, Vermeers, Poussins and others 
may eventually change the very reasons for 
celebrating ‘the original’. 
 
We can also approach this process differently by 
focusing on more indirect and subtler ways of 
technological determination. For example, many 
scientists and philosophers point out (Oliveira 2017, 
Perez 2018) that neural networks not only 
revolutionise information sciences and software 
industry, but also undermine our social, political, and 
existential categories. There is, of course, nothing 
exceptional in the fact that a technological device – 
treated metaphorically – serves as an 
epistemological tool to discover new ‘truths’ about 
ourselves (Draaisma 2000). Even camera proved to 
be a useful device for those philosophers and 
neuroscientists who in the 19th century posited 
analogies between physical processes of taking 
pictures and creating memories (hence the term 
‘photographic memory’). Yet it is still possible to 
maintain that there is an important difference 
between clay tablets, cameras, computers, and 
holograms on the one hand and artificial neural 
networks on the other, which are mathematical 
models describing the ‘character of nervous activity’ 
(McCulloch, Pitts 1943). This time around it was the 
discourse of biology which informed and inspired 
mathematicians and computer scientists to look for 
new concepts. For that reason the history of 
scientific research on neural networks (Bishop 2014) 
in many ways coincides and intersects with the 
emergence of a new paradigm in neurosciences and 
philosophy of mind labelled as ‘connectionism’. And 
the growing popularity of connectionist theories in 
recent years was induced – at least to some extent 
– by the successes of engineers working on non-
symbolic AIs. 
 
The key idea behind connectionism is that biological 
organisms think in an inherently distributed and non-
symbolic way (O’Brien, Opie 2002): human mind is 
a network functioning in an environment composed 
of other networks. Thoughts – falsely perceived by 
humans as essentially logical and meaningful – are 
actually activation patterns of neurons in complex 
and interconnected webs. For instance, according to 
the connectionist interpretation the meaning of a 
word should not be understood as a referential 
relation between an arbitrary set of sounds or letters 
and an abstract concept, but rather as a path of 
activation between areas in a neural network. And 
these pathways must vary for every individual, so it 
becomes impossible to find a universal model of 
thought. Moreover, these pathways are never fixed 
for good. Mental representations made of distributed 
sets of smaller micro-representations change 
dynamically through experience and learning: 
sometimes by forming new associations between 
neurons, sometimes by slightly changing values in 
the existing connections. As the activation levels of 
neurons always cover a spectrum of electrical 
intensity (values), thought processes are thus more 
probabilistic than deterministic. To give an example: 
seeing my dog in the morning will probably lead me 
to think about feeding it, but there is always a chance 
(depending on context) to experience less probable 
activation patterns (which would be called 
‘interesting thoughts’ or ‘creative reflections’). From 
the connectionist perspective thoughts executed in 
neural networks consist in forming and computing 
simple relations between nods. What causes me to 
eventually feed the dog is not some abstract 
understanding of the digestive process in mammals 
but years of (mindless) successful repetition 
resulting in low levels of environmental uncertainty 
(satisfied dog on a couch vs. restless and irritated 
creature). 
 
For many scientists this new approach to cognition 
is revolutionary. Andy Clark and Rudi Lutz claim that 
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the recent successes in the field of neural networks 
can turn out to be of great epistemological 
importance for the simple reason that they falsify the 
common consensus about thinking and intelligence 
as symbolic processes. Connectionism brings thus 
a – yet another – ‘Copernican Revolution’ and may 
eventually overthrow the essentialist foundations of 
the ‘rationalist picture of mental life’ in cognitive 
sciences and (folk) psychology (1992: 11). And 
although Clark and Lutz refrain from further 
generalization, the impact of this epistemological 
shift can reach even further into culture and politics. 
Reconceptualising intelligence as an emergent 
phenomenon that arises from a large number of 
micro-process in complex networks calls into 
question some of the uncontested assumptions of 
the Western rationalist culture. 
 
One of such assumptions is human autonomy 
(liberal subject) which, in turn, relies on the belief in 
free will and universal bases of rationality. 
Connectionist claims about the distributed nature of 
thinking undermine this ideal, while deep learning 
software, like the one used to make the Next 
Rembrandt, exposes the possibility to reverse-
engineer individual sensibilities. The appearance of 
intelligent machinic agents in the field of culture 
which / who are capable of creation poses a serious 
threat to the Western episteme. And this is 
particularly important in the context of modern art 
which – as Rancière convincingly demonstrates – 
supports the political project of Enlightenment by 
reinforcing the notion of the autonomous individual. 
It was possible for Rancière to downplay the role of 
‘technical reproduction’, because the technology 
could have been considered a passive tool in the 
hands of an autonomous human being. Copies were 
derivatives of the art work (material object which can 
be accessed), and the art work was an expression 
of the irreproducible identity. For that reason – as it 
turned out – despite Walter Benjamin’s speculations 
mechanical reproduction only strengthened the 
cultural bias towards celebrating art in relation to the 
artist’s persona. But deep learning software which 
enables translation of Rembrandts, Goyas or even 
Mozarts into a myriad of connections in a neural 
network makes this paradigm somewhat 
problematic. It is not only the technology itself which 
proves disruptive for the cultural values – also the 
epistemological revolution which undermines old 
categories and beliefs can play a role in the 
weakening of the aesthetic regime. 
3. TOWARDS NON-AUTONOMOUS ART 
Although Rancière speaks of three regimes of art 
that can be singled out in the so-called ‘Western 
tradition’, I will focus only on the last one: the 
aesthetic. The reason for that is simple: both ethical 
and representative regime, though still very present 
in contemporary culture, play only a minor role in the 
institutionalised (professional) channels of art 
circulation. The ethical – ‘primarily concerned with 
the origin and telos of imagery in relationship to the 
ethos of the community’ (Rockhill 2004: 4) – and the 
representative – establishing axioms that pin down 
arts’ appropriate forms – function on the margins of 
the art market and (contemporary) art institutions. 
What is even more important, these institutions 
which are often criticised and influenced by the 
defendants of the ethical or representative duties of 
art, were, in fact, decisively shaped by the aesthetic 
regime.ii  
 
In The Politics of Aesthetics Rancière argues that 
the seemingly commonsensical understanding of 
artworks as things ‘extricated from their ordinary 
connections’ emerged relatively late: in the 18th 
century. Only after the downfall of the ancien régime 
could art have liberated from the rigid classification 
of art forms (paragone) and hierarchy of genres 
which tied forms of expression to appropriate subject 
matter (tragedy for the noble, etc.). By identifying art 
with absolute autonomy the emerging aesthetic 
regime delegitimised old criteria for distinguishing 
‘true’ works of art. However, in practice – to 
compensate for the lack of a standardised model 
(poetics) – new art institutions and critical discourses 
had to be invented to solidify this newly obtained 
autonomy. After the French Revolution artists – and 
their allies among critics – began to contest norms 
and proclaim independently what can be considered 
as art. Meanwhile new art institutions – independent 
salons, galleries and even theatres – engaged in a 
political process of creating a new kind of 
subjectivity: that of a liberal, middle-class citizen 
(Elias 2010 [1939]). And although Rancière does not 
elaborate in details on the exact relation between 
modern art and the formation of a ‘specific type of 
humanity’, the aesthetic autonomy of art was 
crucially connected to the notion of the individual 
autonomy: the artists were free to express 
themselves through their works, whereas the 
viewers could depend on themselves in matters of 
taste. For example, in Kant’s view aesthetics 
judgments are determined by subjective experience 
(2007 [1970]: 34), and in Schiller’s utopian project 
(aesthetic state) the role of art in democratic society 
lies in its power to educate free citizens (1954 
[1795]: 140). To sum up, by praising the autonomy 
of art the aesthetic regime established an intricate 
infrastructure of institutions, critical discourses and 
practices which also reinforced individual autonomy. 
Therefore, despite many attempts at revolting 
against this status quo – mostly by the avant-
garde(s) – the name of the individual remained the 
primary form of indexing and assigning value to 
artworks.iii 
 
Without a doubt ‘The Next Rembrandt’ can be easily 
situated within this paradigm. Indeed, the new-old 
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painting was celebrated and attracted interest 
precisely because of the importance and value 
assigned to the name of the Old Master. However, 
the sheer possibility to extract ‘the essence’ of 
Rembrandt’s style and exploit it to create new 
masterpieces disproves the metaphysical 
assumption about the singular and irreproducible 
character of individual aesthetic sensibilities. The 
devil is in the (technical) detail – the computer-
generated picture is neither a copy, nor a new 
picture (hence ‘The Next’?). It contradicts the 
assumption of such dichotomy. The neural network 
trained to learn the specificity of a particular style 
does not translate it into a set of universal rules 
(deterministic algorithms), but rather develops a 
probabilistic (and fuzzy) model of aesthetic 
preferences. In the case of the ‘Next Rembrandt’ 
project, as explained on the official website, ‘a facial 
recognition algorithm identified and classified the 
most typical geometric patterns used by Rembrandt 
to paint human features. It then used the learned 
principles to replicate the style and generate new 
facial features for our painting’. In other words, the 
network studied Rembrandt’s paintings long enough 
to spot regularities typical of the way he portrayed 
his characters. And what is of note here is the fact 
that the software used for that goal was not written 
with this particular task in mind, so it cannot be 
argued that the genius artist was replaced by a 
genius scientist who managed to formalise 
‘Rembrandtness’. After hours of analysing pictures 
and finding regularities, a program which could be 
used otherwise developed a distributed Rembrandt-
algorithm. Its specificity was dependent on ‘data’ 
and was not determined by intentionally 
programmed algorithmic infrastructure. It is also 
important to mention in this context that the 
computational architecture of neural networks does 
not fit into the standard von Neumann’s model of 
computation which separates between Processing 
Units and Memory Units. Software written for von 
Neumann machines is always programmed in high-
level languages like C or Java (which can be learned 
by humans) and only later translated into a low-level 
assembly language. For that reason, programs 
written in symbolic languages establish a rigid frame 
of possible operations. To change the program one 
has to (intentionally) break into the source code and 
change specific instructions. One can thus stand by 
the division into intelligent design (programmed by 
intelligent and intentional beings) and stupid data. In 
turn, neural nets possess the ability to learn on their 
own and in essence can be understood as 
programming themselves, with or without 
supervision, depending on the architecture. When 
neural networks analyse data looking for (any) 
patterns, they do not exactly ‘know’ what they are 
looking for. 
 
Looking at this fact from an epistemological point of 
view, it can be argued that ANNs as semi-
independent agents interrupt the chain of intentional 
conduct between humans, their tools and final 
products. That is why, even if a network manages to 
produce the most astonishing, abstract and 
exceptional images, these cannot be considered 
products of an autonomous mind (or a genius 
programmer for that matter). The Next Picassos – 
made and circulating on the art market in the name 
of their genius creator – will be nothing more and 
nothing less than products of big data analysis and 
probabilistic projections of the results. But if 
individual sensibility is thus proven to be computable 
and transferable (‘Can you send me klee.art? I need 
a new rug and always thought that he would make a 
great weaver’), the idea of irreducible (singular) 
genius can – in the long run – turn out to be difficult 
to sustain.  
 
Of course, we can (and probably will for some time) 
anthropomorphise neural networks as artists. The 
titles of articles in newspapers informing about art 
projects involving ANNs reveal this humanistic bias: 
New Neural Algorithm Can 'Paint' Photos In Style Of 
Any Artist (Dainius 2016), Deep Learning Paints 
Videos in Style of Art Masters (Salian 2016), 
Google’s art machine just wrote its first song 
(Brandom 2016) etc. However, anthropomorphising 
software – that is strengthening associations 
between humans and machines – could potentially 
lead to the emancipation of automatised arts. This 
will probably fit perfectly into the already-present 
tendency in contemporary art to liberate media, 
which Peter Weibel describes in the following 
passage of Postmedia Condition: ‘[S]tate of current 
art practice is best referred to as the post-media 
condition, because no single medium is dominant 
any longer; instead, all of the different media 
influence and determine each other. (…) The very 
terms “user innovation” or “consumer generated 
content” bear witness to the birth of a new kind of 
democratic art in which everyone can participate’ 
(2012). Neural networks – as quasi-media that 
possess their own ‘alien agencies’ (Salter 2015) – 
add another element to this equation and liberate 
arts from the constraints of the older regimes of art.  
 
However, the revelation that aesthetic sensibilities 
are computable in the form of distributed 
representation in neural networks can potentially 
lead to the moment of ‘aesthetic singularity’, that is, 
identification of artworks, artists, and art markets as 
types of networks. Interestingly, this weird idea 
popped-up in the mind of John Cage – stimulated by 
Norbert Wiener’s cybernetics and Buckminster 
Fuller’s futurology – who already decades ago 
compared Robert Rauschenberg’s paintings to 
‘nets’ (1973: 100). According to Cage, the 
remarkable quality of Rauschenberg’s body of work 
consisted in that it neither represented reality (as 
something fixed and external) nor expressed his 
ideas (internal states), but rather simply established 
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connections between objects on canvas. Within 
such conceptual framework one can also think of 
artist’s individual sensibility as a form of self-trained 
network which creates new networks (on canvases) 
to circulate in larger networks of art distribution. 
 
To end my speculations about the potential “crisis” s 
in the aesthetic regime of art I would also like to 
remark that the high valorisation of the original and 
the celebration of the author should also be seen in 
an economic perspective. The relative importance 
assigned to ‘masterpieces’ stems from their scarcity 
(as originals, signed copies etc.) and the finite 
(mortal) nature of the creative individual. Again, it 
explains why mechanical reproduction of art and the 
celebration of the original can co-exist peacefully or 
even reinforce one another. In contrast, by 
undermining the dogma of scarce geniuses the 
zombification of art market and of creative 
production questions the very logic which dictates 
how and why we deal with art in the first place. Of 
course, the unconvinced might still argue that neural 
networks are only capable of ‘reverse-engineering’ 
old culture stored in digital databases. However, it is 
easy to imagine networks fed with more diversified 
data and thus producing completely new aesthetics, 
just like Alpha-Go, a neural network that won with 
Lee Sedol, the world champion in Go, surprised 
everyone by coming up with unique strategies, 
described by many commentators as ‘beautiful’ 
(Metz 2016). The inclination to use neural networks 
to mimic old masters – which we observe today – 
only exposes the anthropocentric bias of some 
engineers and of the aesthetic regime.iv The 
machines are not to blame here. 
4. TOWARDS A PROBABILISTIC REGIME OF 
ART? 
It is not my intention to suggest that the 
zombification of art will contribute to the exclusion of 
humans from the creation of art. On the contrary, the 
disruptive effect of including ‘intelligent agents’ into 
the social networks opens up new possibilities of 
play and cooperation between machinic and human 
neural networks. One example of such co-operation 
is Neural Exchange, a collaborative project initiated 
by John Gerrard, who used Google’s TensorFlow 
software to analyse patterns of movements 
performed by a team of athletes. Patterns 
recognised by the network were then used to train a 
3D leaf-covered figure which executed its weird 
choreography in an empty space of digital 
simulation. Moreover, the instantaneous 
appearance of such websites as deepart.io or 
deepdreamgenerator.com indicates that the Internet 
and its vast databases of easily-accessible images, 
sounds and text will provide the primary 
infrastructure for art co-created with neural 
networks. Hopefully, zombies will be joined by other 
monstrosities and miscreations to play with. 
 
Nevertheless, what can turn out to be crucial with 
regard to the emergence of a new regime of art is:  
 
(i) the vastness of databases which open up 
almost infinite space of possibility for 
creative co-operation;  
(ii) unquestionable hegemony of the Internet as 
physical infrastructure for the creation and 
circulation of ‘artworks’; 
(iii) yet another ‘death of the Author’, this time, 
though, resulting from quite literal 
emancipation of artistic ‘media’. 
These three factors may contribute to the slow 
emergence of what I would like to call a ‘probabilistic 
regime of art’. I want to speculate that the specific 
‘type of connection’ between ways of making art, 
distributing it and categorizing it will shift towards 
forms of dynamic, distributed and probabilistic 
governance. The adjective ‘probabilistic’ refers to 
two different aspects of such hypothetical ‘system’. 
Firstly to the fuzzy and uncertain character of new 
critical discourses which replace symbolic rigidness 
of categories typical for literary culture with collective 
and distributed forms of ‘content distribution’. Of 
course first signs of such transition are clearly visible 
and the role of deep learning technologies, 
employed for prediction and guidance of Internet 
users, has already been recognised and reflected 
upon (Mackenzie 2015). Services like Spotify which 
own large databases of ‘art’ rely on neural networks 
to provide listeners with virtual assistance. These 
probabilistic systems which predict individual taste 
to make suggestions do not – by any means – 
exclude other forms of distributing information about 
art. Instead, systems of probabilistic guidance 
interact with individual users (listeners), content 
creators (musicians) and institutions (magazines 
publishing playlists) to create complex systems of 
feedback. These complex, networked and not only 
human systems of connecting and transmitting art 
definitely do not fit into any of Rancière’s regimes. 
The rule of the autonomy, crucial in the aesthetic 
order, is displaced by the supremacy of 
interconnectedness. On top of that, as I would like to 
suggest, popularisation of ANNs – that is non-
symbolic intelligences – slowly undermines the 
hegemony of the symbolic systems of governance. 
 
By the other ‘probabilistic’ aspect of the postulated 
regime I suggest that automation of creativity and 
potential overabundance of art can possibly lead to 
the appreciation of ‘improbability’. Although this part 
of my argument is more speculative, some of the 
recent trends in contemporary art would confirm 
such a hypothesis. For example, the widespread 
celebration of weirdness and uncanniness among 
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‘postinternet’ artists can be understood in such 
terms. It is no coincidence – although implying 
causation would be an overstatement – that many of 
the artists who are associated with this new 
aesthetics, like Zach Blas or Cecile B. Evans, 
parasitise on critical (academic) discourses, but only 
to expose the inefficiency and inadequacy of 
symbolic reasoning in the age of complex networks. 
In one of the manifestos written for the 9th Berlin 
Biennale, which was probably the biggest 
celebration of postinternet weirdness, Rob Horning 
wrote symptomatically: ‘Content on the internet is 
pure form. We are scandalized by its lack of 
meaning’ (2016). What seems like a Baudrillardian 
fatalism soon takes an unexpected turn. If social 
networks unavoidably turn people into ‘farms of 
content’, the only left to do is to make it weird: 
‘Having a self (…) is to generate content that 
becomes harder to comprehend and integrate as it 
accumulates.’ His bizarre standpoint which equates 
selfhood with artistic production also corresponds 
with a cultural phenomenon of a much bigger scale, 
namely the ‘dank’ culture of internet natives. Its 
identity lies exactly in the fetishisation of the weird, 
incomprehensible, obscure – of messages (memes) 
that seem highly improbable while still possessing 
the minimum amount of meaning. New content 
quickly attracts attention, because of its obscurity, 
then spreads rapidly through social media, its initial 
value inflates (at this moment it is appropriated by 
‘the normies’) and the swarm moves on, just like a 
horde of zombies. However, the attraction to the 
obscure, unlike in the aesthetic regime, must 
coincide with absolute non-autonomy – the ‘artwork’ 
is there to circulate, definitely not to be left alone on 
a pedestal. The original meme is worth just as much 
as any other. In the end, its value depends only on 
its probability: the dank community celebrates the 
lower values, ‘normies’ are attracted by the higher 
ones. It is, of course, nothing more than fortune-
telling on my behalf, but it seems possible to me that 
in a reality flooded with images, songs, poems and 
3D-printed sculptures we will have to rely on the 
notion of probability to make any sense of this 
complex mess. 
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